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IS THE SENSE-DATA THEORY A
REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORY?
Fiona Macpherson
Abstract
Is the sense-data theory, otherwise known as indirect realism,
a form of representationalism? This question has been under-
explored in the extant literature, and to the extent that there is
discussion, contemporary authors disagree. There are many differ-
ent variants of representationalism, and differences between these
variants that some people have taken to be inconsequential turn
out to be key factors in whether the sense-data theory is a form of
representationalism. Chief among these are whether a representa-
tionalist takes the phenomenal character of an experience to
be explicable in virtue of the properties of an experience that
represent something or explicable in virtue of that which gets
represented. Another is whether representationalists hold a non-
reductionist, or naturalistically or non-naturalistically reductionist
variant of representationalism. In addition, subtle differences in
what one takes phenomenal character to be on the sense-data
theory – either awareness of sense-data or the sense-data
themselves – together with one’s account of representation, are
crucial factors in determining whether sense-data theory is com-
patible with representationalism. This paper explores these rela-
tionships and makes manifest the complexities of the metaphysics
of two central theories of perception.1
1. Introduction
Is the sense-data theory of perception – otherwise known as indi-
rect realism – a representationalist theory of perception? This
question has not received much attention in the literature, despite
two facts. First, representationalism and sense-data theory are two
major theories in the philosophy of perception and discussions of
1 Many thanks are due to Clare Batty, Derek Brown, and James Stazicker for discussion
and feedback on earlier drafts, which made this essay better than it would otherwise have
been. This work was supported by two grants from the Arts and Humanities Research
Council (grant numbers AH/I027509/1 and AH/L007053/1).
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them are extensive. Second, those philosophers that have
discussed this question have provided different answers to it.
In this paper I seek to answer the question and, in doing so,
explain why people have given different answers. Unsurprisingly,
the answer turns out to depend on which version of representa-
tionalism and which version of indirect realism one considers.
However, there are more versions of each than one might have
expected, and whether indirect realism is a representationalist
theory turns on different factors in different cases.
I will proceed, in section two, by explaining the theory of
perception and its account of perceptual experience known as
‘representationalism’. There are many different varieties of rep-
resentationalism, and consensus does not exist on which theories
the term should cover. In section three, I will explicate the indi-
rect theory of perception and its account of perceptual experi-
ence, and outline the varieties of this theory. In section four, I will
consider which varieties of indirect realism are compatible with
minimal representationalism. In section five, I consider which
varieties of indirect realism are compatible with weak, strong, and
reductive forms of representationalism. In so doing, I shed light
on the significance of the different varieties of each of these views,
and bring to light some important considerations about the
nature of representation.
2. Representationalism
Representationalism is a theory that says something about repre-
sentation and something about phenomenal character. I begin
this section with short standard elucidations of these terms.
Further elaboration of them then occurs throughout this essay. I
then consider the different forms of representationalism.
The term ‘phenomenal character’ refers to ‘what it is like’ for
subjects to have certain mental states.2 Think of your favourite
perceptual experience – a visual experience of the sky at twilight
when the sky is midnight blue, perhaps. There is something that
it is like to see that shade of blue, and what it is like is crucial to
your having that experience. Of course when you see an expanse
of blue there are typically all sorts of other conscious states that
2 Nagel (1974) introduced the famous ‘what it is like’ locution into philosophical
literature.
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you are in at the same time. You might auditorily experience the
sound of voices and clinking glasses, you might be aware of the
position of your body lying back on the grass, you might think
about what you are going to eat for dinner, and feel tired, and so
on. In thinking about what it is like to see something blue you are
supposed to abstract away from all the other experiences and
conscious states that you are having and consider only that part of
your conscious mental life that corresponds to visually experienc-
ing the colour of the sky.3 If there was nothing that it was like to
experience the colour of the sky, then you wouldn’t be having that
experience at all. If there was something different that it was like,
then you would be having a different kind of experience –
perhaps you would be having a visual experience of a light blue
sky, or the visual experience that you are having right now as you
read this page. Or, indeed, you might not be having a perceptual
experience at all but some other state with phenomenal character,
for example, a sensation such as a pain state. Mental states with
phenomenal character include perceptual experiences, such as
those involved in seeing red squares, hearing music, or tasting
whisky; bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, and pains; and
emotions or moods, such as feelings of fear, jealousy, and depres-
sion. Memories and imaginings of such states often have phenom-
enal character too. It is a contested issue whether judgments,
thoughts, or occurrent beliefs ever have phenomenal character or
whether such states are simply accompanied by other states that
do – typically imagery states.4
Note that ‘phenomenal character’ is taken to be a philosophi-
cally neutral term that leaves open the ontological and epistemo-
logical nature of states with phenomenal character. Thus, for
example, holding that there is phenomenal character does not
commit one to a dualist, physicalist or functionalist account of the
mind, nor does it commit one to thinking that we have or lack
infallible or indubitable knowledge of elements our own mind. In
this respect, it is unlike the term ‘qualia’, which is often taken to
indicate commitments to a dualist perspective and special know-
ledge of phenomenal states.
3 Whether or not it is possible to do such abstraction turns on the extent to which
experience is essentially multimodal. While I think that some experiences are essentially
multi modal – see Macpherson (2011) – I don’t believe that all are. I believe that the sort
of abstraction called for is frequently possible.
4 This debate – the cognitive phenomenology debate – is examined in Bayne and
Montague (2011).
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Representational states are states that are about, or are directed
towards, something. The paradigm representational states are
beliefs and judgments. Your judgment that Scotland is the best
country in the world is about Scotland and how good it is. Think of
your visual experience of the black letters on this white background
(the paper or the screen). The experience, one might think, seems
to be about the letters, the background, and their respective
colours. In having the experience, your mind is directed towards
these things. Elucidated thus, representation might seem a rather
straightforward concept. In fact, there are a host of complexities
lurking behind the simple description that I have just given. Spell-
ing out what it is for a state to be representational is a subject of
much debate, as will become clear later in this essay.
Representationalism is perhaps the most popular theory of the
nature of experience in contemporary analytic philosophy. It
comes in three different strengths: minimal, weak and strong.
Cross-cutting those distinctions, representationalism can also
come in what I will call a ‘feature of experience’ and a ‘represen-
tational content’ variety. It can also come in a reductive and a
non-reductive variety. I will begin by explicating the distinction
between minimal, weak and strong varieties.
According to the most minimal form of representationalism,
experiences are, at least sometimes, representational states. More
particularly, the claim is that the phenomenal character of experi-
ence is, at least sometimes, representational. A stronger claim is
that that all phenomenal character is representational. I will call a
position that affirms either of these two claims, but which does not
go on to make the further claims of weak and strong representa-
tionalism that I outline below, ‘minimal representationalism’.
Representationalists often make stronger claims than that
demanded by minimal representationalism. One such claim is that
phenomenal character is always representational and that there
can be no difference in the phenomenal character of experience
without a difference in the representational content of experience.
The second part of this claim is the claim that the phenomenal
supervenes on the representational.5 Consider your experience of
5 When using the term ‘supervenience’ I mean only to indicate the claim that there can
be no difference in one set of properties without a difference in another set of properties.
I do not mean to further imply or deny that there is a determination relation between the
subvenient and supervenient properties. Sometimes, but not always, ‘supervenience’ is
used to indicate that there is a determination relation present, sometimes a determination
relation specifically less strong than that of identity or reduction.
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the midnight blue sky. It has a particular phenomenal character
and, as I said previously, this experience plausibly represents mid-
night blue. Suppose that it does. The supervenience claim guaran-
tees that any experience that has a different phenomenal character
will not represent midnight blue but something else instead. Fol-
lowing Tye (2009) I will call a representationalist theory that
endorses these claims, but not the still stronger claims that I am
about to outline, ‘weak representationalism’.
‘Strong representationalism’ is the view that not only does phe-
nomenal character supervene on representational content, but
representational content supervenes on phenomenal character.
Again, consider your experience of the midnight blue sky and
suppose that it represents midnight blue. What is being claimed is
that all experiences that represent midnight blue will have that
phenomenal character and all experiences with that phenomenal
character will represent midnight blue. I will call this claim the
‘mutual supervenience of the phenomenal and the representa-
tional’. The mutual supervenience of the phenomenal and the
representational has great prima facie plausibility. Experiences
with the typical phenomenal character had while looking at mid-
night blue and experiences with the typical phenomenal charac-
ter had while looking at yellow ochre always seem to represent
different colours – midnight blue and yellow ochre respectively.
Likewise, experiences that represent midnight blue and experi-
ences that represent yellow ochre always seem to have different
phenomenal characters. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how two
experiences that were the same in what it was like to have them
could represent different things. What would indicate to one that
there was this difference between them? Some strong representa-
tional theorists hold that the simplest explanation of the mutual
supervenience of the phenomenal and the representational is that
phenomenal character is identical to the representational nature
of experience. Again, following Tye (2009), I will call views that
endorse either the mutual supervenience of the phenomenal and
the representational, or the type-identity of the two, ‘strong rep-
resentationalist’ views.6
Orthogonal to these distinctions between minimal, weak, and
strong representationalism is the distinction between ‘feature of
experience’ types of representationalism and ‘representational
6 The terms ‘weak representationalism’ and ‘strong representationalism’ are, unfortu-
nately, not used consistently in the extant literature. Compare, for example, Chalmers
(2004), Lycan (2006) and Tye (2009). Tye’s usage is most convenient for my purposes.
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content’ types of representationalism. To understand the differ-
ence, consider again minimal representationalism. This was the
view that phenomenal character is either at least sometimes, or
always, representational, but that there are no supervenience rela-
tions between phenomenal character and representation. The
feature of experience version of this view is that the phenomenal
character of an experience is a feature (in other words a property)
of an experience and this feature sometimes or always represents.
To take an example, the phenomenal character of an experience
of seeing midnight blue would be a feature of the experience (one
might call it ‘phenomenal blue’) and it might represent some-
thing on a particular occasion – most plausibly, it might represent
midnight blue.
One can be a weak representationalist or a strong representa-
tionalist and hold the feature of experience view by, in the former
case, adding the claim that phenomenal character supervenes on
representational content to the view just spelled out and, in the
latter case, by in addition adding the claim that representational
content also supervenes on phenomenal character. If one makes
the stronger claim still that phenomenal character and represen-
tation are identical then one will not hold that phenomenal char-
acter has the property of representing certain things but that the
property of having a certain phenomenal character just is the
property of representing certain things. The feature of experi-
ence account of representationalism is the way that Chalmers
(2004) understands representationalism.7
The alternative to the feature of experience view is the ‘repre-
sentational content’ view. On this view, phenomenal character is
sometimes or always to be identified with the representational
contents of a mental state. There are two main views of what the
contents of a mental state are. On one, the contents are a propo-
sition, namely, that which is introduced by a ‘that’ clause. On
another, the contents are to be identified with the objects, prop-
erties and relations that are represented – a Russellian view of
content. I will write only about the Russellian version of the rep-
resentational content view in the rest of this paper, and call
it the ‘representational content view’ because so many prominent
representationalists advocate this view, and for sake of parsimony.
7 Rather than talk of phenomenal character, Chalmers (2004: 341) talks about phe-
nomenal properties, which he takes to be properties of experiences (and properties of
subjects of experience).
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Therefore, for the rest of the paper, I will ignore the former
version of the view. The reader should duly note this fact.
On the Russellian version of this view then, the phenomenal
character of an experience of seeing midnight blue, for example,
would be identical with the content of that experience, namely,
identical with the property midnight blue (as opposed to the
property of representing midnight blue). The representational
content form of representationalism therefore denies that phe-
nomenal character is a property of an experience, strictly speak-
ing, although it may wish to maintain that we can say, very loosely
and informally, that phenomenal character is something that
experience has. Rather, it says that phenomenal character is,
sometimes or always, the representational content of an experi-
ence, namely, that which gets represented by an experience. This
is the way that Tye (1995, 2000, and 2009) and Dretske (1995)
spell out representationalism.
One can be a minimal representationalist, a weak representa-
tionalist, or a strong representationalist and hold the representa-
tional content view. On the minimal view one would have to hold
that sometimes or always particular token instances of phenom-
enal character are identical with particular token instances of
properties or of objects, or at least the temporal part of the token
instances of properties or of objects that corresponded to the
temporal existence of the phenomenal character. One would be a
weak representationalist by adding the claim that types of phe-
nomenal character, such as the type of phenomenal character had
by your experience of the midnight blue sky, supervene on types
of representational content, such as the property blue. And one
could be a strong representationalist by, in addition, holding the
claim that types of representational content supervene on types of
phenomenal character or the stronger claim that types of repre-
sentational content are identical with types of representational
content.
The astute reader will have noticed that, when first outlining
minimal, weak and strong representationalism, I used the term
‘representational’ unconjoined to ‘content’ to elide the differ-
ence between the feature of experience view and the representa-
tional content view. I will continue to do that in the rest of this
essay.
In my opinion, the distinction between the feature of experi-
ence view and the representational content view has not been
clearly enough made, nor its significance appreciated. For
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example, Chalmers says that the difference between these two
views is ‘simply a terminological difference’ and that ‘representa-
tionalists’ most important claims can be put in the terms used
here [the feature of experience way] without loss’ (2004: 156).
However, this downplays the fundamentally very different
accounts of phenomenal character that each of the views puts
forward. On both views, phenomenal character characterises
what it is it like to have our experiences. It is also said to be that
which we are directly aware of in experience. On the feature of
experience view we are directly aware of some property of our
experience, and thereby – when circumstances are right – indi-
rectly aware of properties in the world. On the representational
content view, we are directly aware of the contents of our experi-
ence, namely, that which is represented and thereby – in the
right circumstances – directly aware of worldly objects and prop-
erties. And those, Tye points out, are not properties of experi-
ence. Given this, Chalmers is only correct that the feature of
experience view and the representational content view are ter-
minological variants of each other if we modified the feature of
experience view and held that we are not aware of what that view
takes to be the phenomenal character of our experiences – we
are not aware of properties of our experience. But it is not
obvious that one can do that and still maintain that phenomenal
character specifies what it is like to have experience on that view,
and it is certainly not the standard way to elucidate the feature of
experience view. Thus, while the bumps under the carpet can be
flattened at some places for some purposes, they re-emerge in
other places.
Moreover, Tye is adamant that it is crucial to understanding the
import of his view that we take him to be endorsing the represen-
tational content view and not the feature of experience view. In
this regard he says:
Arguably, representationalist theories are best understood as
rejecting even the basic assumption that the phenomenal char-
acter of a state is a property of that state, intrinsic or otherwise . . .
Buy into the supposition that experiences are inner ideas or
pictures viewed by an inner eye and it may be natural to take the
‘feel’ of an experience to be a property of the idea or picture.
But that isn’t common sense. It is philosophical dogma—
precisely the dogma which representational theories of phe-
nomenal consciousness oppose. (Tye 2009: 256)
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Here we can also see that Tye wishes to restrict the term ‘rep-
resentationalism’ to cover the representational content view, and
he doesn’t count the feature of experience view as a form of
representationalism. This is the first instance of several that we will
encounter where people restrict the use of ‘representationalism’
more tightly than I am in this essay. However, we will see that these
people restrict the use in different ways, which lends credence to
my to my more liberal characterisation.
To summarise, so far we have seen that there are three forms of
representationalism:
(1) Minimal (core claim: some or all phenomenal character is
representational; denies (2) and (3))
(2) Weak (core claim: all phenomenal character is representa-
tional and the phenomenal supervenes on the representa-
tional; denies (3))
(3) Strong (core claim: all phenomenal character is represen-
tational and either the phenomenal and representational
mutually supervene on each other or the phenomenal and
representational are identical).
And we have seen that each of these views can be understood in
two different ways. One way interprets the representational as
being the property of representing some content. This is the
feature of experience way. The other way interprets the represen-
tational as being the content of experience itself – that which is
represented. See table 1 for a summary.
Some philosophers claim that a view has to endorse (2), weak
representationalism, in order to be a form of representationalism.
(See, for example, Kind (2003).) Others claim that it has to
endorse (3), strong representationalism. (See, for example,
Chalmers (2004).) Nonetheless, some people use the term to also
cover (1), minimal representationalism.
Table 1 Types of representationalism illustrated showing that
minimal, weak and strong representationalist each come in two
kinds: the feature of experience view and the representational
content view
Feature of
Experience View
Representational
Content View
Minimal/Weak/Strong Minimal/Weak/Strong
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There is one distinction between types of representationalism
still to be elucidated: that between reductive and non-reductive
representationalism. If one reduces one thing to another then
one explains one of the things in terms of the other without
remainder. Most reductionist representationalists try to explain
phenomenal character in terms of the representational (either in
terms of the property of representing certain things or in terms of
that which is represented). The aim of reductionists is often to
give a naturalistic account of representation, and then to fully
explain phenomenal character in terms of it, thereby providing a
naturalistic account of phenomenal character. One way to do this
is to identify phenomenal character with the representational,
yielding reductive strong representationalism. Another way to
do this is to claim that that while phenomenal character is
not identical to the representational, it supervenes on it and is
determined by it in a sense that entails that phenomenal character
does not belong to an ontological category distinct from that to
which experiential representation belongs. This is reductive weak
representationalism.
A naturalist thinks that explanation of phenomena should be
continuous with the explanations given in the physical sciences –
in their present or idealised form. More particularly, they think
that objects, properties, and events are spatio-temporal, physical
things. To explain things in a naturalistic manner is to explain
them solely by reference to spatio-temporal objects and properties
and the spatio-temporal relations that such things bear to each
other – spatial relations, like being above or being five hundred
miles away from, and temporal relations, like being before or
being ten years later than – and other relations that science
recognises, such as causal relations.8
Rather than reduce phenomenal character to the representa-
tional, one could try to reduce representation to phenomenal
character. However, because of the problems of accounting for
consciousness and phenomenal character in a naturalistic
manner, this approach has generally been eschewed by natural-
ists. Nonetheless, a related project has been proposed. On this
account, one partially explains the representational in terms
of phenomenal character. One does not fully explain it in terms of
phenomenal character because no reduction of the nature of
8 A longer and more nuanced discussion of what naturalism is and its metaphysical,
epistemological and methodological forms is to be found in Macpherson (2000).
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phenomenal character is provided. Nonetheless, phenomenal
character is said to ‘ground’ intentionality, meaning that the
former is in some sense explanatorily prior to the latter. One
suggestion is that phenomenal character partially constitutes the
representational. People who hold such a view include Horgan
and Tienson (2002), McGinn (1988), and Siewert (1998).
Non-reductive representationalists attempt no reduction
between the phenomenal and the representational or vice versa.
It is open to such representationalists to give a naturalist account
of phenomenal character, representation, both, or neither.
At this point one might wonder if there could possibly be strong
representationalists who identify phenomenal character and the
representational, yet who deny reductionism. For one might think
that if someone asserts an identity between two things then they
are committed to reducing one to another. But this is not the case.
Reduction requires more than identity. If one reduces one thing
to another, then one explains one of the things in terms of the
other, because one thinks that the term used to name that to
which one thing is reduced is a term mentioned in a lower-level
theory – a more basic or fundamental theory – than the theory
which contains the term for that which gets reduced. Consider,
for example, asserting an identity between Fiona’s favourite
colour and Colin’s favourite colour. One need not think that one
can be explained in terms of the other or think that one is more
basic or fundamental. Likewise, when people have asserted an
identity between Hesperus and Phosphorous, they have done this
without reducing one to the other, for neither of the terms ‘Hes-
perus’ or ‘Phosphorous’ belong to a more fundamental theory
than the other. Thus, an identity can be posited without a reduc-
tion. Identity is a symmetric relation, whereas the reductive rela-
tion is an asymmetric one. Consider that if one identifies water
with H2O, and claims that water can be reduced to H2O, then one
is committed to denying that H2O can be reduced to water. Thus,
strong representationalists who identify phenomenal character
and the representational can either be reductive or non-reductive.
The non-reductive representationalists posit an identity but not a
reduction. The reductive representationalists will, in addition to
identity, posit a reduction. They will hold that the term ‘represen-
tation’ belongs to a lower-level naturalistic theory and the term
‘phenomenal character’ belongs to a higher-level theory.
Both weak and strong representationalism, and both the
feature of experience version and the representational content
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version of each, can come in reductive or non-reductive kinds.
Note however, that the minimal view cannot be reductive as its
claims about the relationships between phenomenal character
and representation are too weak to support a reduction.
Returning to considerations about what views are worthy of the
name ‘representationalism’, some people hold that only reductive
forms of representationalism deserve it. One such person is Block
(1996: 19), who characterises the distinction between reductive
representationalism and all other accounts of the relation
between phenomenal character and the representational as
‘(t)he greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind–maybe even all
of philosophy’. However, as we have seen, there are many other
views that go under the name ‘representationalism’. All these
kinds of representationalism are identified in table 2.
I have now laid out the various forms of representationalism.
It is not my purpose to weigh up the plausibility of them in this
paper. 9 While many find representationalism plausible, and find
the naturalistic picture of the mind that reductive versions of it
adhere to attractive, there have been many attempts to under-
mine representationalism. Some have come from questioning
whether some or all experiences represent, others from trying
to show that the mutual supervenience of the phenomenal
and the representational is false, and others trying to under-
mine naturalistic accounts of representation, particularly when
such accounts have to fully explain phenomenal character
as well.
In section three, I outline the sense-data theory and its varieties,
before going on, in sections four and five, to ask whether the
sense-data view is a form of representationalism.
9 My own criticisms of representationalism are laid out in Macpherson (2000), (2002),
(2003), (2005), and (2006).
Table 2 Kinds of Representationalism
Property of
Experience View
Representational
Content View
Reductionist Weak/Strong Weak/Strong
Nonreductionist Minimal/Weak/
Strong
Minimal/Weak/
Strong
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3. The Sense-Data Theory
The classic sense-data theory of theory of perception goes by many
names. It has been called ‘indirect realism’. And, confusingly, it
has been called ‘the representational theory of perception’, ‘the
representative theory of perception’, and even simply ‘represen-
tationalism’. Going by names alone, one might think that the view
should have clear affinities with the forms of representationalism
that I outlined in section two. While there are some, it is the
purpose of this paper to make clear exactly what they are, and
what they are not.
I will only use the term ‘sense-data theory’ to refer to the theory
of perception under consideration in this section. This will allow
me the terminological ease of being able to inquire as to whether
it is a form of representationalism – the view outlined in section
two.
According to sense-data theorists, we perceive mind-
independent physical objects and properties – such as tables and
chairs – indirectly, in virtue of being directly aware of some
sensory or mental objects called ‘sense-data’.10 These sense-data
represent mind-independent physical objects and their proper-
ties. (One can see why the view is also called ‘indirect realism’
now. According to realism, worldly objects are mind-independent
and have at least some of the properties that we take them to have.
According to the sense-data theory such mind-independent
objects are indirectly perceived.11) The world we are directly or
immediately aware of in perceptual experience is not the external,
physical mind-independent world, but merely a mind-dependent
internal world, that represents the external world. The represen-
tation may be accurate, such as when we perceive the world to be
as it is, or inaccurate, such as when we suffer from some illusion or
undergo a non-veridical hallucination. (Non-veridical hallucina-
tions are contrasted with veridical hallucinations. Veridical
10 Modern proponents of sense-data theory include Jackson (1977) and Robinson
(1994). A famous early version is held by Russell (1912/1998) and (1913). One should
note that when Moore (1953) and other theorists in the early 20th century, used the term
‘sense-data’ they often used it to refer to the direct objects of perception – whatever they
turned out to be: mental objects, physical objects, or the surfaces of physical objects. The
term ‘sense-data’ is now, however, used in the way I am using it in this paper: to refer to
mental objects that are directly perceived. See Huemer (2011).
11 According to one view that posits sense-data, we do not see, nor are there any
mind-independent objects; we are only aware of sense-data. However, I set aside forms of
idealism and phenomenalism in this paper. Those views are nicely outlined in Dancy
(1985).
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hallucinations are ones that are accurate, perhaps by wild
co-incidence, or perhaps because someone has cunningly
arranged the world to be as the hallucination represents it to
be.12) It is often thought that the conditions required for indi-
rectly perceiving mind-independent physical objects are that the
internal mental objects represent the physical objects accurately,
at least to some degree, and that there is an appropriate causal
relation between the physical and mental objects. Affirming this is
affirming a version of the causal theory of perception.
In the next section, I ask whether the sense-data theory is
compatible with minimal representationalist views. In so doing, I
begin to tease out different versions of the sense-data view.
4. Is Sense-Data Theory Compatible with
Minimal Representationalism?
Is the sense-data theory a representationalist theory? In order to
address this question, in this section, I consider whether the sense-
data theory is compatible with the minimal representationalist
claim that at least some phenomenal character is representa-
tional. One might have thought that the answer to this question
was trivially, yes – for the sense-data view is that sense-data represent
mind-independent objects and their properties. However, we
have to be careful here. The answer turns out to be far more
nuanced.
The answer to the question depends on two things. One is
exactly how we unpack the idea that phenomenal character is
representational. Recall that there were two ways of doing this: the
feature of experience way and the representational content way.
This means that there are in fact two distinct questions that the
original question masks, either of which one may be interested in
asking: (1) is the sense-data theory compatible with the idea that
at least sometimes phenomenal character represents something
and (2) is the sense-data theory compatible with the idea that at
least sometimes phenomenal character is identical to the repre-
sentational content of experience. The second thing that the
answer to the question depends on is what phenomenal character
is taken to be on the sense-data view. There are, in fact, two good
12 The nature of hallucination is explored at length in Macpherson (2014).
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candidates. The first is the sense-data themselves and their prop-
erties. The second is our awareness of our sense-data and their
properties.
These options allow us to set up a two-by-two table, the columns
of which represent different forms of representationalism, and
the rows of which represent two different forms of sense-data
theory each of which corresponds to what one takes phenomenal
character to be on the sense-data theory. See table 3 below, which
the reader might wish to consult as the various deliberations in
this section unfold.
So let us answer each of the two questions in turn. Consider the
question: (1) is the sense-data theory compatible with the idea
that at least sometimes phenomenal character represents some-
thing. Let us suppose first that the phenomenal character of
experience is the sense-data themselves and their properties. On
this view, clearly the sense-data theory could be a minimal repre-
sentational view, for sense-data and their properties represent the
world (and one need not affirm any stronger relation between
phenomenal character and representation). This consideration
allows us to fill in the answer in the top left white square of
table 3.
Now let us suppose, secondly, in answering the same question,
that the phenomenal character of the experience consists in
one’s awareness of sense-data and their properties. Thus we are
considering how to fill in the answer in the bottom left white
square in table 3. Does this awareness represent anything? Is the
relation of awareness that one bears to one’s sense-data a repre-
sentational relation? If so, then, this would be another sense in
which the sense-data view would be a minimal representational
view.
Byrne (2001) has claimed that the sense-data view is a repre-
sentational view on the grounds that I have just been consider-
ing.13 He claims that the phenomenal character of experience on
the sense-data view consists of awareness of sense-data. And he
argues that this awareness relation is a representational relation.
But is Byrne right to think that the relation between oneself and
one’s sense-data is a representational relation? I will answer this
13 Byrne (2001) does not distinguish between minimal, weak and strong forms of
representationalism, but presumably if he says that the sense-data theory is compatible
with representationalism tout court then he would at least think it compatible with minimal
representationalism.
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Table 3 Whether the Sense-Data View is compatible with a
Minimal Representationalist View
Feature of
Experience View
Representational
Content View
Phenomenal
character is the
sense-data and
their properties
Compatible with
minimal
representationalist
view
The content of
experience is the
sense data
=
Compatible with
minimal
representationalist
view
The content of
experience is
mind-independent
objects
=
Not compatible
with a minimal
representationalist
view
Phenomenal
character is
awareness of the
sense-data and
their properties
Acquaintance is
not a form of
representation
=
Not compatible
with a minimal
representationalist
view
Not compatible
with a minimal
representationalist
view
Acquaintance is
a form of
representation
=
Compatible with
a minimal
representationalist
view
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by considering how one might understand ‘acquaintance’, the
relation between oneself and one’s sense-data that Russell, one of
the main expositors of the sense-data view, proposed.
As conceived of by Russell (1912/1998), the relationship that
one bears to one’s sense-data in being aware of them is acquaint-
ance. A test for whether one is acquainted with something is
whether one can sensibly doubt that the candidate object of
acquaintance does not exist, given one’s evidence.14 Only if one
cannot so doubt, can one be acquainted with the thing. There-
fore, the test provides only a necessary condition for the presence
of acquaintance. It does not provide a sufficient condition. What
else does Russell say about acquaintance? He claims that it is a
primitive relation – a simple fundamental relation not explicable
by others. Does saying this much about acquaintance allow us to
determine whether it should be contrasted with representation or
whether it should be seen as a particular form of representation –
a form of representation of mental objects? That is a difficult
question to settle.
On one reading of Russell’s view, it would be tempting to think
that acquaintance and representation should be contrasted.
Russell is keen to distinguish acquaintance from judgement,
which clearly involves representation, and is the paradigm of the
representational state. Acquaintance is a relation that a subject
bears to a single object – a sense-datum – claims Russell. Because
it is a two-term relation, he claims there is not a question of
whether the sense-datum exists, nor a question of whether the
relation can be true or false or accurate or inaccurate.15 When
you, for example, experience ‘the redness of this’, and hence are
acquainted with your sense-datum, according to Russell, there is a
relation between you and one single, although complex, object,
‘the redness of this’.16 In contrast, Russell thinks that judgement is
a relation to a proposition, which is composed of more than one
object. When you judge ‘this is red’ there is a relation between you
and red and this (between you and two objects). And Russell says
that such a relation can be true or false: ‘In the case of judgment,
error can arise; for although the several objects of the judgment
14 This is the orthodox test. See, for example, Fumerton (2009). An interesting ques-
tion, and a place at which disagreement may arise, is what one should take one’s evidence
to be when applying the test.
15 See Russell (1913: 76), quoted in Savage (1989: 140).
16 See Whitehead and Russell (1910) cited in Savage (1989: 141).
IS THE SENSE-DATA THEORY A REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORY? 385
© 2014 The Author. Ratio Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
cannot be illusory, they may not be related as the judgment
believes that they are.’17
Given this, one might think that on Russell’s view, acquaintance
is not representation because (i) acquaintance guarantees that
one cannot doubt the existence of what one is acquainted with,
but representation does not guarantee that one cannot doubt the
existence of what one represents and, (ii) acquaintance is a rela-
tion to an object, which is not something that can be true or false,
while representation is a relation that one bears to something that
can be true or false – a proposition. If that is correct, then on
Russell’s view, acquaintance is not representation.
However, Byrne (2001) claims that there is no good reason to
accept the claim that representation requires the possibility of
misrepresentation. Beliefs in necessary truths (such as two plus
two equals four) and the Cogito (I think therefore I am) provide
counterexamples. When one believes these things there is no
possibility that they could be false, and, in the case of the Cogito,
one can plausibly argue, as Descartes did, that one cannot doubt
it to be true. Thus, Byrne is arguing that representation need not
be the way that it is characterised in (i) and (ii) above. If Byrne is
right, then it has not been shown that acquaintance should not be
thought of as a form of representation.
However, even if Byrne is right that that representation does
not require the possibility of misrepresentation, nonetheless, a
difference that Russell highlights between acquaintance and rep-
resentation remains. For Russell, acquaintance is a relation
between a person and an object. Representation is a relation
between a person and a proposition that is composed of more
than one object. Someone wishing to defend Byrne’s position
could argue that Russell is misguided in what either the objects of
acquaintance or the objects of representation are.
One could try to do this by claiming that acquaintance is rep-
resentation in perceptual form. For example, Byrne (2001) claims
that we should understand perceptual representation as occur-
ring whenever things seem a certain way to a subject. According to
this understanding, Byrne claims, because sense-data will always
seem a certain way to a subject they will be represented to the
subject. If one accepts this then one could hold that acquaintance
is a relation between a person and one object but hold that
representation can also be a relation between a person and one
17 Russell (1913: 76) quoted in Savage (1989: 140).
386 FIONA MACPHERSON
© 2014 The Author. Ratio Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
object, say the complex object “the redness of this”. Alternatively,
one could hold that both representation and acquaintance
involve relations between a person and a proposition, rather than
an object. In the case of acquaintance, one could hold that a
subject’s experience will represent, say, that there is a red sense-
datum, and in so doing relate the subject to the proposition that
there is a red sense-datum.
However, Byrne’s notion of representation, as occurring when-
ever things seem a certain way to a subject, is not uncontroversial.
For example, his notion of representation has been challenged by
Pautz (2009) on the grounds that it trivialises the debate concern-
ing whether experiences represent and have contents. On Byrne’s
notion of representation, perceptual experiences could not fail to
have contents, says Pautz, and so the question of whether (even
minimal) representationalism is true or not becomes entirely
trivial and not one that is open to debate. Pautz goes on to
develop his own conception of representation – the identity con-
ception, the complex details of which need not be explored here
– according to which sense-data are not represented in experience
(2009: 493).
What we can see from this discussion is that the question of
whether we each bear a representational relation to our own
sense-data is a question that is highly sensitive to the exact way that
one spells out the nature of representation. Those in favour of the
view that we do will hold a very weak notion of representation that
allows such cases to count. Those that do not will complain that
such a view cannot be what is at issue in determining whether we
represent our own sense-data precisely because the view trivially
entails that we represent our own sense-data. Those people will
insist on a more demanding notion of representation.
To summarise where we are, recall that we were considering the
first of two questions: (1) is the sense-data theory compatible with
the idea that at least sometimes phenomenal character represents
something. What we have seen is that if we take phenomenal
character to be the sense-data and their properties the answer is
yes. If we take the phenomenal character to be the relation of
awareness that we bear to our sense-data then the answer is
unclear. Some people, like Byrne, will answer yes as they think that
this relation is a representational relation. Others will resist this,
arguing that this relation is a special relation of acquaintance that
should be distinguished from representation. The left-hand white
column of table 3 summarises these results.
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Let us now consider our second question: (2) is the sense-data
theory compatible with the idea that at least sometimes phenom-
enal character is identical with the representational content of
experience. Again the answer will vary depending on whether one
takes the phenomenal character of experience to be the sense-
data and their properties or the relation of awareness that we bear
to our sense-data.
If one takes the former view of phenomenal character then
there are two distinct answers that one could give, depending on
what one takes the content of the experience to be. If one takes
the content of one’s experience to be the sense-data and their
properties because one thinks of one’s awareness of sense-data as
a representational relation then the sense-data and their proper-
ties would be representational contents – so the answer to the
question would be yes.
If one takes the content of one’s experience to be mind-
independent objects in the world – and one is asking whether
sense-data are to be identified with that (either because one
doesn’t think that one’s sense data are contents or because
one takes one’s experience to have two levels of content: both
sense-data and mind-independent objects) then phenomenal
character will not be the representational content of one’s
experience.
The way to see this last point clearly is to distinguish between
vehicles and content. When used appropriately, the word
‘hamster’ represents the kind hamster. The vehicle is the printed
word on the page or the sound of the spoken word (the thing that
does the representing) and that which is represented is a kind of
small loveable furry animal. According to the version of the sense-
data theory under consideration, sense-data and their properties
are vehicles of representation for contents that are mind-
independent objects. Were I to see a hamster, according to this
theory, I would have a certain sense-datum that I am aware of that
is a vehicle that represents a hamster – a hamster that is a content
of the experience. And, recall, that on the view under considera-
tion, phenomenal character consists in the sense-datum and its
properties (the vehicle) not what is represented (a hamster).
Thus the answer to the question of whether this version of the
sense-data theory is compatible with minimal representationalism
is no.
The results of our considerations so far about the second
question are summarised in the top right white box of table 3 .
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Finally, if one takes the view that the phenomenal character of
experience is the relation of awareness that we bear to our sense-
data, then the answer will be that the sense-data view is not a
minimal representational view, for whether or not this relation is
one of representation or a distinctive one of acquaintance, in no
way is the awareness itself the representational content of experi-
ence. This result is recorded in table 3 in the bottom right white
box.
To summarise the response to question (2), is the sense-data
theory compatible with the idea that at least sometimes phenom-
enal character is identical with the representational content of
experience, the answer in all but one case is no. If one takes the
content of one’s experience to be the sense-data because one
thinks of one’s awareness of sense-data as a representational rela-
tion then the sense-data and their properties would be represen-
tational contents, so the answer to the question would be yes. But
on all other views of what the content of experience is, the answer
is no.
Overall, therefore, there are some senses in which the sense-
data view is compatible with a minimal representationalist view
and some senses in which it is not a representationalist view at all.
This is because of the different interpretations of what being a
minimal representationalist view is, the different accounts of the
nature of phenomenal character on the sense-data view, and the
different accounts of representation itself.
In this section the discussion has been about the relationship
between sense-data theory and minimal representationalism.
In the next section, I turn to consider what the relationship
is between sense-data theory and weak, strong, and reductive
representationalism.
5. Is Sense-Data Theory Compatible with Weak, Strong, and
Reductive Representationalism?
Now that we have a grip on the relationship between sense-data
theory and minimal representationalism, we can see that forms of
sense-data theory could be developed that were forms of weak and
forms of strong representationalism. In every instance in which
the sense-data view is compatible with minimal representational-
ism, one could simply add specifications to one’s sense-data
theory of the relations between the phenomenal character of the
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experience and what one’s sense-data represent required for
either weak or strong representationalism. For example, suppose
that one held that phenomenal character is identical to sense-data
and their properties. One could hold that all perceptual experi-
ence involves sense-data that represent the mind-independent
world and that the phenomenal character of one’s experience
supervenes on what one’s sense-data represent. However, note
that such a view is not mandatory; one could equally develop a
sense-data theory incompatible with a weak feature of experience
version of representationalism. One might do so because one
wishes to hold that the same sense-data, or the same types of
sense-data, can represent different things on different occasions.
Likewise, one could develop versions of sense-data theory that
were forms of strong representationalism. For example, one could
hold that one’s sense-data and their properties always represent,
and that the phenomenal character of one’s experience and what
one’s sense-data represent mutually supervene. Here is another
example: one could hold that all phenomenal character involves
representing one’s sense-data, and that the phenomenal charac-
ter of one’s experience, and how one’s sense-data are represented
to be, mutually supervene on each other, and are in fact identical
to one another. These would be strong feature of experience
forms of representationalism. Again, however, clearly such a view
is not mandatory and many versions of sense-data theory will not
be strong representationalist views.
Finally, the sense-data view is clearly not a naturalist reductive
representationalist view. Recall that the aim of naturalist
reductionist representationalist theories is to give a naturalistic
account of representation and then to fully explain consciousness
and phenomenal character in terms of representation, thus pro-
viding a naturalistic account of phenomenal character. The sense-
data theory takes sense-data to be non-physical mental objects that
have properties, and that do not exist in physical space. Hence a
naturalistic characterisation of them cannot be given. The phe-
nomenal character of an experience consists in either the sense-
data and their properties, or in being aware of sense data and
their properties. Phenomenal character is not, therefore, on the
sense-data view, something that could receive a naturalistic expla-
nation, nor is an explanation of it given solely in terms of
representation.
Could one hold a non-naturalist reductive representationalist
sense-data view? Recall that there are two forms of non-naturalist
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reductive representationalist views. According to one view, phe-
nomenal character can be reduced to representation. According
to another view, representation can be reduced to phenomenal
character.
If one held a version of weak or strong representationalism
then either of these positions would be open to one to hold if one
were a sense-data theorist, if one could find reasons to think that
one or other notion was explanatorily more basic.
6. Conclusion
In section two, we saw that people applied the term ‘representa-
tionalism’ to different theories. We saw that some people withheld
the name ‘representationalism’ from the view I have called
‘minimal representationalism’, others withheld the name from
feature of experience forms of representationalism, and others
still withheld the name from non-reductive representationalism.
Moreover, we have seen, in section three, that there are various
views of what phenomenal character is on the sense-data theory,
and various views about what acquaintance and representation
are. Given this, it is no surprise that the question of whether
sense-data is a form of representationalism has been given very
different answers in the literature. This paper has explained these
differences in detail and, I believe fully addressed the question of
whether the sense-data theory is a form of representationalism.
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